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AUSTRIA: THE 1999 PARLIAMENTARY 
ELECTIONS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
MEMBERS' SANCTIONS 
HEATHER BERIT FREEMAN* 
Abstract: The 1999 parliamentary elections in Austria sparked a fire of 
controversy in the European Union. Led by the far-right activist Joerg 
Haider, the Freedom Party achieved a second place victory, causing 
leaders and activists to voice their concerns about Austria's future. 
Acting on that apprehension, the individual members of the European 
Union joined together to issue diplomatic sanctions against Austria, an 
unprecedented action. When the sanctions were lifted in September, 
2000, the European Union was left to reexamine its role and to 
determine whether to amend its founding treaties to reflect any 
changes in the relationship between the government of the European 
Union and its Member States. 
INTRODUCTION 
"Xenophobia Triumphs in Austria's Historic Poll," "Far Right 
Tears up Austria's Political Turf," "Rightist Party Gains in Austrian 
Elections," the headlines of the world's major papers screamed on 
October 4, 1999, the morning after the far-right Freedom Party 
(FPO), led by the charismatic and controversial Joerg Haider, placed 
second in Austria's parliamentary elections, shocking observers across 
Europe and throughout the world.l Garnering 27.3% of the elector-
ate, the FPO edged ahead of the Austrian People's Party (OVP) to 
claim second place, throwing into disarray a coalition government 
that had been dominated by the center-right OVP and the center-left 
* Heather Berit Freeman is an Executive Editor for the Boston ColiRge International & 
Compamtive Law Review. 
I Alex Blair, Xenoplwbia Triumphs in Austria's Historic Poll, THE ScoTSMAN, Oct. 4, 1999, 
at 9, available at LEXIS, News Library, Major Newspapers File; William Drozdiak, Rightist 
Party Gains in Austrian Elections, WASH. PosT, Oct. 4, 1999, at Al6, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, Major Newspapers File; Carolj. Williams, Far Right Tears Up Austria's Political Turf, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1999, at AI, available at LEXIS, News Library, Major Newspapers File. 
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Social Democratic Party (SPO) since 1945.2 In the months to follow, 
the FPO and the OVP would form a new coalition government.3 Fear-
ing that this unlikely alliance indicated growing intolerance towards 
non-whites and foreigners in Austria, the fourteen other Member 
States of the European Union (EU), in an unprecedented action, is-
sued diplomatic sanctions against Austria in February, 2000.4 These 
sanctions were lifted after a team of "wise men" appointed by the 
European Court of Human Rights recommended their termination to 
the President of the European Council in September, 2000.5 
Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty on the EU (TEU) bind the Member 
States to the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human 
rights, and fundamental freedoms, and these Articles reflect the 
states' common distaste for all forms of discrimination; however, no 
provision of the Treaty gives the EU, as a government entity, the 
authority to declare sanctions against a Member State absent a "seri-
ous and persistent breach. "6 The European Council has the authority 
to determine if such a breach exists.7 While Austria's inclusion of a 
politically far-right party in its coalition government justly raised con-
cerns among the EU Members, no action taken by the Austrian gov-
ernment constituted such a breach.8 Therefore, the Member States 
did not act under the procedure outlined in Article 7. Instead, the 
sanctions issued represent a consensus among the fourteen EU Mem-
bers, rather than an official EU action.9 The underlying motive for the 
Members' coordinated measure is "clearly moral;" many officials 
feared that inaction by Austria's EU partners would be read as ap-
proval of Haider's controversial views.1° Austria, on the other hand, 
argued that the sanctions were not necessary, as the nation already 
2 jULIE KIM & KAREN DONFRIED, AUSTRIA: CONTROVERSIAL GoVERNMENT AND EuRo-
PEAN DIPLOMATIC SANCTIONS 6 (CRS Rep. for Congress RL30455, 2000); Williams, supra 
note 1, at AI. 
3 KIM & DoNFRIED, supra note 2, at 6. 
4 Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Austrian Politician Sometimes Down but Never Out, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 23, 2000, at A3, available at LEXIS, News Library, Major Newspapers File. 
5 Suzanne Daley, Europe Lifts Sanctions on Austria, but Vows Vigilance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
13, 2000, at A6, available at LEXIS, News Library, Major Newspapers File [hereinafter 
Daley, Europe Lifts Sanctions]. 
6 TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, OCT. 2, 1997, art. 7, 1997 OJ. (C 340) 145 (as 
amended 1999) [hereinafter TEU]. 
7 !d. 
8 See id. arts. 6, 7; KIM & DONFRIED, supra note 2, at 8. 
9 See id. at 7, 8. 
10 !d. at 8. 
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had its own political and legal safeguards in place.11 The EU Members 
now are left with the dilemma of whether to institutionalize an official 
monitoring procedure in the Treaty on the EU,l2 
This Note examines the Austrian political and legal system and 
the necessity of the Member States' sanctions against Austria. Part I 
provides background on post-World War II Austria, the nation's gov-
ernment and politics, and the rise of the FPO and Joerg Haider. Part 
II examines the October 3, 1999 parliamentary elections and the re-
sulting coalition government, while Part III explores the European 
response to the Austrian election. Part IV analyzes the necessity of the 
sanctions, and Part V looks at proposed EU legislation addressing fu-
ture situations of this type. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Austria s Post-World War II History and Demographics 
Austria is a small country in central Europe with a population of 
approximately eight million.l3 From 1938 to 1945, Nazi Germany oc-
cupied Austria, and during World War II, the Allies called Austria the 
"first victim of Hitlerite aggression. "14 Despite the Allies' abhorrence 
of the German occupation, many Austrians welcomed the union.15 On 
November 1, 1943, the governments of the Soviet Union, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom declared that Austria would be liber-
ated from German domination.16 In 1955, the occupying powers 
signed the Austrian State Treaty, which gave Austria full sovereignty 
and independence.17 Shortly thereafter, Austria passed a law "declar-
ing perpetual neutrality and a ban on entering any military alliances 
or allowing foreign military bases on Austrian territory. "18 In its role 
11 See Press Statement of the Austrian Foreign Minister Mrs. Benita Fererro-Waldner 
(Feb. 14, 2000), at http:/ /www.austria.it/fwraa02.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2000) [herein-
after Press Statement]. 
12 MARTTI AATISAARI,jOCHEN FROWEIN, MARCELINO 0REJA, REPORT (TO THE PRESI-
DENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL] i 117, (Sept. 8, 2000), available at 
http:www.eumc.at/general/report-A/report-en.pdf (last updated Sept. 11, 2000) [herein-
after REPORT]; Inter-Governmental Conference: Progress on Closer Co-operation and Article 7, 
EuR. REP., Oct. 11, 2000, available at LEXIS, European Library [hereinafter Inter-
Governmental Conference]. 
U KIM & DONFRIED, supra note 2, at l. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 HERBERT HAUSMANINGER, THE AUSTRIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 7 ( 1998). 
17 KIM & DONFRIED, supra note 2, at l. 
18 Id. 
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as a neutral state, Austria viewed itself as a bridge between the East 
and West during the Cold War and hosted a number of United Na-
tions agencies and international organizations in Vienna.19 Despite its 
political neutrality, however, Austria remained closely aligned with 
western democracies both culturally and ideologically.2° 
In a June, 1994 referendum, 66% of Austrians demonstrated 
their favor for EU membership, which led to the signing of the Treaty 
of Accession of Austria to the EU on June 24, 1994.21 This Treaty sub-
sequently entered into force, and Austria became a member of the 
EU onJanuary 1, 1995.22 Presently, Austria is one of the wealthiest EU 
Members.23 Over 60% of the nation's imports and exports come from 
or go to other EU countries, rendering the nation's economy largely 
dependent on the EU.24 Currently, Austria is one of eleven EU Mem-
ber States that has adopted the Euro and, consequently, it has imple-
mented an economic plan in accordance with European Monetary 
Union requirements.25 Traditionally, Austria's economy operated as "a 
corporatist system of 'social partnership' between government, indus-
try, labor, and agriculture."26 In the 1980s, however, the government's 
role began to wane as a result of the privatization of many enterprises 
formerly under state ownership. 27 The services sector dominates the 
economy, and tourism generates approximately 15% of the nation's 
capital.28 
Over 9% of Austria's population is considered "foreign," with 
communities of ethnic Magyars and Croats living in the province of 
Burgenland and Slovenes in Carinthia.29 Nevertheless, 98% percent of 
Austrians speak German.3° In 1996, more than 700,000 immigrant 
workers were registered in Austria, and an unknown number of illegal 
immigrants and refugees presently reside there.31 
19 Id. at 1-2. 
20Jd. 
21 HAUSMANINGER, supra note 16, at 14; KIM & DONFRIED, supra note 2, at 2. 
22 Id. 
23 KIM & DoNFR!ED, supra note 2, at 2. 
24Jd. 
25 See id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
26 KIM & DONFRIED, supra note 2, at 2-3. 
29 HAUSMANINGER, supra note 16, at 1; KIM & 00NFRJED, supra note 2, at 3. 
so HAUSMANINGER, supra note 16, at 1. 
31 KIM & DONFRIED, supra note 2, at 3. 
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B. Government and Political Structure 
The Austrian Constitution refers to two distinct representative 
bodies-the National Council and the Federal Council.32 The Na-
tional Council is referred to as "Parliament," and functions as the 
"central decisionmaking organ. "33 One hundred eighty-three deputies 
are elected, each for a four year term, by the electorate, which is 
comprised of all Austrian citizens over eighteen who have not been 
convicted of a crime.34 All members of the Austrian voting population 
"enjoy a general, equal, immediate, personal and secret right to 
vote. "35 The electoral system used to determine the composition of 
the Parliament is based on proportional representation of contending 
political parties.36 Under this complicated and somewhat confusing 
system, essentially, the number of votes cast for a party is used to cal-
culate the number of seats that the party gains in Parliament.37 In 
turn, from among its members, the Parliament elects a President, a 
Second President, and a Third President.38 The three presidents and 
the party whips form a steering committee that organizes the work of 
Parliament. 39 
As in other democracies, such as the United States and most 
other European countries, political parties play a major role in the 
exercise of state functions in Austria.40 The Political Parties Act of 
1975 provides, "[t]he existence and plurality of political parties are 
essential components" of the Austrian democratic system and "[t]he 
tasks of the political parties include their participation in the policy-
making process. "41 An all-inclusive state-funding plan has developed 
since 1960 which, as of the passage of the Political Parties Act, in-
cludes the state funding of all party organizations.42 While political 
parties may form freely in Austria, the Political Parties Act, the Prohi-
bition Act, and the State Treaty prohibit the revival of national social-
32 HAUSMANINGER, supra note 16, at 46. 
33 !d. 
34 !d. at 43, 46. 
35 !d. at 43-44. 
36 !d. at 44. 
37 See HAUSMANINGER, supra note 16, at 43-44. 
36 !d. at 46. 
39 !d. at 46-47. 
40 See id. at 36. 
41 !d. at 39. 
42 HAUSMANINGER, supra note 16, at 39 n.9. 
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ism, and the Constitutional Court outlawed the right-wing National 
Democratic Party in 1987.43 
As mentioned above, two major parties dominated the Austrian 
political landscape for over fifty years--the center-left SPO and the 
center-right OVP.44 The stable political environment that resulted 
from the long-term coalition between these two parties was marked by 
a fair-minded and practical approach to policy-making.45 Scholars 
note, however, that the agreement between the parties resulted in 
large part from a lack of attractive alternatives.46 
Though originally founded as the Austrian Communist Party, the 
modern SPO represents the mainstream left of the political spec-
trum.47 The SPO traces its centrist roots to the post-World War II 
years, when leaders sought to expand its support base and moderate 
its orientation.48 Committed to issues of social welfare, equality, jus-
tice, and Austria's permanently neutral status, the SPO claimed al-
most 600,000 members in the 1980s, but that number has declined 
steadily in recent years.49 
With a more decentralized party structure than the SPO, the 
OVP represents the mainstream conservative Christian democratic 
movement.50 Like the SPO, the modern OVP was established in the 
years following World War II in an attempt to broaden its appeal,51 
The OVP maintains a strong focus on European integration, pressing 
in recent years for consideration of Austrian membership in NATQ.52 
C. ]oerg Haider and the Freedom Party 
Since 1955, the FPO has served as Austria's third major political 
party.53 The FPO succeeded the Association oflndependents, a group 
of "disgruntled liberal and national voters. "54 For this reason, the FPO 
was stigmatized as "nationalist" and remained isolated until it began 
43 !d. 
44 KIM & DONFRIED, supra note 2, at 3. 
45 !d. 
46 See id. 
47 KIM & DONFRIED, supra note 2, at 3. 
48 fd.; HAUSMANINGER, supra note 16, at 41. 
49 !d. 
50 KIM & DONFRIED, supra note 2, at 4. 
51 HAUSMANINGER, supra note 16, at 41. 
52 KIM & DONFRIED, supra note 2, at 4. 
53 !d. 
54 HAUSMANINGER, supra note 16, at 42. 
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to emphasize more mainstream ideas in the mid-1960s.55 Under the 
leadership ofjoerg Haider, the FPO has risen to new prominence.56 
Prior to Haider's securing leadership of the FPO in 1985, the 
party's representation in Parliament was a mere 5%.57 Haider imme-
diately employed his "charisma and skill" to shape the party into a far-
right national movement.58 In ten years, the "youthful" leader with 
"seemingly boundless energy" attracted enough new followers to raise 
the FPO's parliamentary representation to 22% in 1995.59 Much of 
Haider's impact has been attributed to his ability to attract protest 
voters, who were drawn initially by his mantra of "attack rather than 
compromise. "60 
Known for shifting his positions on issues for strategic reasons, 
Haider was forced to resign as Governor of the Province of Carinthia 
in 1991 after he publicly commended the "sound employment poli-
cies" of the Third Reich, a statement that was interpreted as an en-
dorsement of slave labor.61 Haider's political legacy was tainted fur-
ther by a 1993 split in the FPO, resulting in the formation of the 
Liberal Forum, and the failure of "Austria-first," an anti-immigration 
initiative sponsored by Haider.62 Haider faced an additional setback in 
his political agenda when he failed to garner adequate support for his 
campaign against the 1994 referendum on Austrian membership in 
the EU.63 The referendum passed with 66% of the vote.64 Concerns 
were raised again in 1995 when Haider extolled former members of 
Hitler's Waffen SS as "decent people of good character who also stick 
to their convictions. "65 Earlier in the same year, he had been criticized 
for referring to Nazi concentration camps as "punishment camps," 
implying that the inmates who suffered there were guilty of crimes.66 
Despite these political stumbling blocks, Haider managed to regain 
his position as Carinthian Governor in 1998. 
55 ld. 
56 KIM & DONFRIED, supra note 2, at 4. 
57 HAUSMANINGER, supra note 16, at 42. 
58 Id. 
59 HAUSMANINGER, supra note 16, at 42; Williams, supra note 1, at A1. 
60 HAUSMANINGER, supra note 16, at 42. 
61 Drozdiak, supra note 1, at A16. 
62 !d.; KIM & DONFRIED, supra note 2, at 4. 
63 KIM & DoNFRIED, supra note 2, at 4. 
64 ld. at 2. 
65 ld. at 15. 
66 ld. 
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In 1999, Haider outlined his priorities in a "Contract with Aus-
tria" and managed to appeal to men, youth, professional workers, and 
increasingly to blue-collar workers, who traditionally aligned them-
selves with the SPQ.67 His Contract with Austria listed a number of 
populist initiatives, including increasing social benefits, introducing a 
23% flat tax, decreasing immigration, cutting the size of government, 
injecting a "more entrepreneurial spirit into the economy," and 
fighting corruption.68 Haider's success largely has been attributed to 
his ability to tap into rising public resentment of the long-standing 
coalition between the SPO and the OVP. 69 The two parties, which 
dominated Austria's politics from 1955 until 1999, created a govern-
ment packed with friends and supporters which was considered by 
many to be frozen in bureaucracy. 7o One Austrian voter summarized 
sentiments about the cronyism between the two parties, commenting, 
"I was sick of the two big parties doing their deals together. It was time 
for a change and the Freedom Party was the only option. "71 
Haider's more controversial positions are those arising from his 
far-right extremism and, in particular, his anti-immigrant activism.72 
His 1999 campaign slogan in Vienna was "stop the over-
foreignization," which raised suspicions and gained disapproval from 
observers.73 Critics also condemned Haider's promise of zero immi-
gration, due to concerns that the pledge might restrict further refu-
gee access to Austria, lead to mass deportations of illegal immigrants, 
and promote violence towards both legal and illegal immigrants al-
ready residing in Austria.74 Furthermore, Haider's history of anti-
Semitic comments and his perceived potential to appeal to neo-Nazis 
spurred some members of Austria's Jewish community to threaten to 
leave the country after the FPO's rise to power.75 Many of Austria's 
9000 Jews reported that they would not remain in Austria if Haider 
and his party became part of the Austrian coalition government. 76 
67 ld. at 4. 
68 KIM & DoNFRIED, supra note 2, at 4; Drozdiak, supra note 1, at Al6. 
69 KIM & DoNFRIED, supra note 2, at 4. 
7o Williams, supra note 1, at AI. 
71 Philip Sherwell, International: Austrian Shift to Right Risks jewish Exodus, SuNDAY ThL. 
(London), Oct. 10, 1999, at 26, available at LEXIS, News Library, Major Newspapers File. 
72 KIM & DONFRIED, supra note 2, at 5. 
73 ld. 
74 ld. 
75 Sherwell, supra note 71, at 26. 
76 ld. 
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Haider's parents embraced Nazism and were punished for their 
affiliation after World War II. 77 Though he admitted that he has the 
privilege of hindsight, Haider stated that, despite his parents' views, "I 
think I would have been in prison during the Nazi period because I 
am a fighter for freedom and not for dictatorship."78 Nonetheless, 
public concern led Haider to issue a statement in November, 1999 in 
which he apologized for his past comments. 79 In this declaration, 
Haider further asserted that the FPO was committed to freedom and 
democracy, and he assured Austrians that "no one need[ed] to pack 
their suitcases and no one [had] to leave their home. "80 
II. THE OCTOBER 3, 1999 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
In what Haider called a "sensational breakthrough," the FPO 
claimed a second place victory in the Austrian parliamentary elections 
held on October 3, 1999.81 In the election, Social Democrats placed 
first with 33.15% of the vote, despite showing their lowest turnout at 
the polls since World War 11.82 Officially, the FPO and the OVP tied 
for second place with 26.91% of the vote, though in actuality the FPO 
received about 400 more votes.83 The Green Alternative Party (GAL) 
acquired the remaining parliamentary seats, with 7.4% of the vote, 
and the Liberal Forum lost all representation by missing the 4% 
threshold necessary to claim any seats.84 The final breakdown gave 
sixty-five seats to the SPO, fifty-two parliamentary seats each to the 
FPO and the OVP, and fourteen seats to the GAL.85 
For many Austrians, their fears of a new government that in-
cluded the FPO were realized when, after months of negotiation, the 
SPO and the OVP were unable to renew their longstanding m::Yority 
coalition.86 Acting Chancellor Viktor Klima of the Socialist Democrats 
initiated talks with the GAL, but the two groups failed to form a mi-
nority government.87 Realizing that there was no hope of forming a 
77 Dominic Lawson, I lead. I lead. I lead the People,. SUNDAY TEL. (London), Feb. 13, 
2000, at 20; Sherwell, supra note 71, at 26. 
78 Lawson, supra note 77, at 20. 
79 KrM & DONFRIED, supra note 2, at 15. 
80 Id. at 15-16. 
81 Drozdiak, supra note 1, at A16. 
82 Id.; KrM & DoNFRIED, supra note 2, at 5. 
83 Id. at 5-6. 
84 Id. at 6. 
85 Id. at 5-6. 
86 Id. at 6. 
87 KrM & DoNFRIED, supra note 2, at 6. 
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government that included the SPO, Klima ended his efforts in Janu-
ary, 2000 and, for the first time, gave the FPO and the OVP the op-
portunity to form a coalition.88 Despite his displeasure with the ar-
rangement, Austrian President Thomas Kletsil stated, "in a 
democracy, a parliamentary majority has to be respected. "89 
III. THE EuROPEAN REsPONSE TO THE NEw AusTRIAN GovERNMENT 
On January 31, 1999, anticipating the formation of a new gov-
ernment that included the FPO, Austria's fourteen EU partners (the 
"Fourteen") pressed the European Council Presidency, at the time 
held by Portugal, to announce three steps that would be taken by the 
EU.90 The steps provided that: (1) the governments of the Fourteen 
would not "promote or accept any bilateral official contacts at [a] po-
litical level with an Austrian Government integrating the FPO;" (2) 
there would be "no support in favor of Austrian candidates seeking 
positions in international organizations;" and (3) "Austrian Ambassa-
dors in EU capitals [would] only be received at the technical level. ''91 
Within twenty-four hours, the proposal, which did not include eco-
nomic sanctions, was circulated and signed by all of the EU Member 
States.92 The European Commission issued a statement on February 1, 
1999, publicizing the views of the Fourteen and reiterating that the 
EU is "founded on principles of liberty, democracy, respect of human 
rights[,] and fundamental freedoms and the rule oflaw."93 
The TEU prohibits Member States from pursuing any actions 
against a fellow Member State absent the existence of a "serious and 
persistent breach.''94 The European Council and the Court of Justice 
have the authority to determine whether such a breach exists.95 Since 
there was no such suggestion in Austria's case, the sanctions levied by 
the Fourteen represent a coordinated measure rather than an official 
EU action, such as a directive or a regulation.96 
88 !d. 
89 !d. 
90 !d. at 8. 
91 Id. 
92 KIM & DoNFRIED, supra note 2, at 8; see Jonathan Clarke, Is the EU Ready for Prime 
Time?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2000, at B9, available at LEXIS, News Library, Major Newspa-
pers File. 
93 KIM & DONFRIED, supra note 2, at 8. 
94 TEU, supra note 6, art. 7. 
95 !d. 
96 !d. 
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By issuing diplomatic sanctions against Austria before the swear-
ing-in of the new government, the EU Members had hoped to prevent 
its formation; however, this effort failed.97 On February 3, 2000, one 
day before the new government took office, President Kletsil pushed 
the leaders of the OVP and the FPO, Wolfgang Schussel and Joerg 
Haider respectively, to sign a joint statement responding to interna-
tional concerns.98 The declaration, entitled "Responsibility for Aus-
tria-A Future in the Heart of Europe," reaffirms Austria's "unswerv-
ing adherence to the spiritual and moral values which are the 
common heritage of the peoples of Europe."99 In the statement, 
Haider and Schussel expressed the Austrian Government's commit-
ment to human rights and condemned "any form of discrimination, 
intolerance and demagoguery. "100 The two party leaders further 
committed themselves and the Austrian Government to the principles 
of the EU as expressed in Article 6 of the Treaty and voiced Austria's 
support for EU expansion)Ol 
Furthermore, the European Parliament contemporaneously 
adopted a resolution condemning Haider's views)02 In this declara-
tion, the Parliament affirmed European distaste for past statements 
made by Haider that expressed "insulting xenophobic and racist" 
views.103 The resolution stresses that "any Austrian government must 
respect the spirit and the letter of the fundamental principles of the 
Treaty" and calls on the European Commission and Council to moni-
tor developments in Austria and throughout Europe.104 In the midst 
of this imbroglio of disapproving commentary and comeback, Presi-
dent Kletsil swore in the new Austrian government on February 4, 
2000. 
IV. THE NECESSITY OF THE EU MEMBERS' SANCTIONS 
Following the issuance of a September 8, 2000 report written by 
the three "wise men" appointed by the European Court of Human 
97 KIM & DoNFRIED, supra note 2, at 8. 
98 Dr. Wolfgang Schussel & Dr. Joerg Haider, Responsibility for Austria-A Future in the 
Heart of Europe, (Feb. 3, 2000), at http:/ /austria.org/newgovtl.htm, (last visited Oct. 11, 
2000) [hereinafter Responsibility for Austria]. 
99 !d. 
100 !d. 
101 !d. 
1o2 Austria-Haider's Views Condemned, EuR. PARL. DAILY NoTEBOOK (Feb. 3, 2000), at 
http:/ /www.europarl.eu.int/dg3/sdp/journ/en/n000203l.htr (last visited Oct. 1, 2000). 
103 !d. 
104 !d. 
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Rights, the EU Members' sanctions towards Austria were lifted on 
September 12, 2000.105 For the most part, the sanctions did little be-
yond promoting the common values of the EU.106 Each Member State 
individually interpreted and implemented the bilateral sanctions, and 
actions commonly included boycotts of school trips, cultural ex-
changes, and military exercises.107 These actions caused some Austri-
ans to see the measures as an expression of aversion towards their na-
tion rather than a commitment to EU principles.108 The sanctions 
were intended as a moral message expressing the significance of the 
principles outlined in Article 6 of the Treaty on the EU; however, be-
cause of safeguards and internal concern about the new coalition 
government, from Austria's perspective, outside pressure from the 
F I~ ourteen was not necessary. 
The new Austrian coalition government reiterated commitment 
to the EU values in a statement issued by Schuessel and Haider on 
February 3, 2000.uo The authors of the report to the European Coun-
cil President do not accredit the statement to pressure from the sanc-
tions, but instead imply that Austria's own concern about the FPO's 
positions led President Kletsil to demand the proclamation. m 
Internal safeguards enable Austria to monitor its own activities 
related to potential human rights violations.u2 In 1958, Austria ratified 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. 113 As declared in 1964, this document has the 
rank of constitutional law within Austria.u4 A further defense protects 
against the formation of national socialist organizations.115 The Aus-
trian Constitutional Court (ACC) has ruled that the prohibition of 
socialism must be implemented by every relevant state authority.u6 
The FPO has been an applicant in the ACC in "many cases concem-
ing electoral matters," but the court has never seen any reason to 
question the FPO's lawfulness in relation to the prohibition of na-
105 Daley, Europe Lifts Sanctions, supra note 5, at A6. 
106 Id. 
107 Suzanne Daley, Report Clears Way for Europe to Drop Austrian Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 9, 2000, at AI, available at LEXIS, News Library, Major Papers File. 
los Id. 
~~ Drozdiak, supra note 1, at A28. 
no Responsibility for Austria, supra note 98. 
lll REPORT, supra note 12, t 86. 
ll2 Id. n 73-75. 
ll3 HAUSMANINGER, supra note 16, at 116. 
114 Id. 
m REPORT, supra note 12, tt 73-75. 
116 Id. i 74. 
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tional socialism. 117 The fact that the FPO has never been convicted for 
engaging in national socialist activities lends support to the idea that 
the sanctions had little effect within Austria other than building re-
sentment towards the EU.u8 
Austrian officials reiterated the state's ability as a democratic na-
tion to monitor its own political activities.u9 Mter expressing disap-
proval of the measures taken by the Fourteen, Austrian Foreign Minis-
ter Benita Fererro-Waldner stressed the nation's commitment to the 
spirit of the EU Treaties in a statement issued shortly after the inau-
guration of the new coalition government.120 In this statement, Fer-
erro-Waldner reminded her audience that the FPO had been in exis-
tence for fifty years and that Austria had spent fourteen years trying to 
isolate the party, only to watch the FPO gain support and prominence 
through populist opposition. 121 The clear implication stemming from 
this declaration is that the FPO's social and political prominence 
risked growth throughout Europe as long as the sanctions remained 
in place.122 The Foreign Minister continued that the other option in 
facing populist opposition was to convince the FPO to "share respon-
sibility ... and to bring them back on a pro-European path. "123 
Ferrero-Waldner's statement reflects a commitment to the Aus-
trian Constitution, which binds the government to "uphold democ-
racy, freedom of expression, tolerance[,] and the prohibition of racial 
discrimination. "124 These ideals are reaffirmed in Austrian legislation 
protecting cultural rights. 125 An amendment to the Austrian Constitu-
tion "promote[s] the existence and activities of the national minority 
groups. "126 Although this amendment did not become effective until 
August 1, 2000, after the implementation of the EU sanctions, its en-
actment had been discussed since 1997.127 In their report, the "wise 
men" also concluded that Austrian policy towards immigrants dis-
played commitment to common EU values.128 
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V. PROPOSED EU MEASURES ADDRESSING CONCERNS RAISED BY THE 
SITUATION IN AusTRIA 
Despite widespread Austrian disapproval of the sanctions, on 
February 28, 2000, Joerg Haider resigned as leader of the FP0. 129 
Haider's resignation generally has been regarded as a strategic move 
aimed at relieving some of the international pressure on the new Aus-
trian government.130 Thus, the Fourteen might view the unprece-
dented sanctions as successful.131 Haider has not disappeared com-
pletely from the political forum, however, as he remains Governor of 
Carinthia, and reports indicate that he has his eye on becoming chan-
cellor in 2004.132 
Mter the sanctions towards Austria were dropped on September 
12, 2000, the EU Member States were left with the decision of whether 
to adopt new legislation outlining procedures to be taken to uphold 
common EU values.133 While Austrians argued that their democratic 
elections were their own concern, social awareness and the increasing 
willingness to intervene in fellow-Member States' affairs led Austria's 
EU partners to conclude otherwise.134 A majority of the Member States 
now believe, and the "wise men's" report recommends, that Article 7 
of the TEU should be amended to introduce a "surveillance and 
. h . ,135 
warmng mec amsm. 
In their report to the President of the European Council, the 
''wise men" note that the addition of a preventative monitoring pro-
cedure would allow the EU to deal with a situation similar to that 
which occurred in Austria from the beginning.136 Furthermore, an 
Article 7 mechanism would reiterate the common European values to 
which the EU Members committed in Article 6 of the TEU.137 The 
primary controversy over such a measure lies in its method of imple-
mentation, and some smaller EU countries remain skeptical of such a 
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proposition, fearing that it unjusdy would interfere with Member 
States' internal affairs. uls 
In addition to an Article 7 provision, the "wise men" suggest the 
establishment of arrangements within the EU institutions to further 
the EU's commitment to human rights. 139 Such plans might include a 
human rights office within, and reporting to, the European Council, 
the appointment of a commissioner responsible for human rights is-
sues, and the expansion of the "existing EU Observatory on racism 
and xenophobia ... in order to make possible the establishment of a 
full EU Agency on Human Rights. "140 
At a December, 2000 summit held in Nice, EU heads of state 
drafted new procedures for sanctioning a Member State.141 Article 1 of 
the Treaty of Nice amends Article 7 of the TEU to require four-fifths 
of the European Council and the assent of the European Parliament 
to "determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Mem-
ber State" of the principles of freedom, democracy, human rights, and 
the rule of law.142 The amendment allows the Member State in ques-
tion to be heard before the European Council, and permits the 
Member to "call on independent persons to submit within a reason-
able time limit a report on the situation in the Member State."143 The 
Treaty of Nice was signed by heads of state or government on Febru-
ary 26, 2001, but it will not enter force until it has been ratified by all 
Member States.144 
CONCLUSION 
The EU Members' sanctions may have produced some benefit 
within the EU despite their controversy in Austria. While Austria's 
people and government resented the treatment the nation received 
from its fourteen disproving EU partners, this reaction was not un-
founded. Austria asserted its status as a democratic nation with its own 
political and legal safeguards, and the report issued by the three "wise 
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men" affirmed this contention. While the sanctions may not have im-
pacted Austria substantially, the measures highlighted an area of the 
TEU that needed attention and resolution. In deciding whether to 
modify Article 7 to include provisions allowing the EU to react to 
events similar to the Austrian elections, the EU Members must con-
sider carefully the role of the EU as a body in relation to each Mem-
ber State. By amending the TEU through the Treaty of Nice, the 
Members would increase the EU's oversight of their own democratic 
elections. Should the Member States decide to ratify the Treaty of 
Nice, the EU will gain the right to intervene when faced with the risk 
of human rights violations. These changes potentially could modify 
the role of the EU and the relationship among the Member States. 
